Stare i nowe interpretacje naturalizmu prawniczego by Stelmach, Jerzy
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
1
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
Old and new interpretations 
of legal naturalism
Stare i nowe interpretacje naturalizmu  
prawniczego
Article history: Received: 21.09.2017 Accepted: 15.10.2017 Published: 30.12.2017
Abstract:
The paper discusses the most important reasons for adopting legal natu-
ralism as well as the relations between legal naturalism and various issues 
in general philosophy. Furthermore, the following perspectives of this con-
ception of the study of law are investigated: philosophical, psychological, 
neuroscientific, economic, legal-philosophical and legal-dogmatic. Another 
discussed issue pertains to the benefits and risks of legal naturalism. The 
benefits surely include the construction of the models of naturalization of law 
which open jurisprudence to novel research methods. The risk is connected 
with the modification of the present standards of interpretation.
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Streszczenie:
W artykule podjęto dyskusję dotyczącą najistotniejszych przesłanek prze-
mawiających za naturalizmem prawniczym, a także wskazano powiązania 
naturalizmu prawniczego z różnorodnymi problemami ogólnofilozoficznymi. 
Rozważone zostały również perspektywy tego nurtu refleksji nad prawem, 
wśród których wyróżnić można perspektywę filozoficzną, psychologiczną, 
neurobiologiczną, ekonomiczną oraz filozoficzno- i dogmatycznoprawną. 
Kolejnym wątkiem analiz są korzyści oraz ryzyka związane z przyjęciem na-
turalizmu prawniczego. Do korzyści z pewnością zaliczyć można stworzenie 
modeli naturalizacji prawa otwierających prawoznawstwo na nowe metody 
badań. Ryzyko związane jest natomiast z modyfikacją istniejących standar-
dów interpretacyjnych.
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1. Naturalism
Naturalistic conceptions of the world and 
knowledge are permanently present in the 
philosophy of the European cultural circle. 
Not only the European cultural circle, but also 
the ancient Indian philosophies or ancient 
Chinese philosophy had a naturalistic branch. 
Let us focus on the European philosophy 
though. In antiquity, the concepts of Democri-
tus, Ionians, Epicureans and Stoics were defi-
nitely naturalistic. Naturalistic interpretations 
of certain views of Aristotle could also be in-
cluded. Although Aristotle’s realism was not 
naturalism, his conception allowed for a bet-
ter understanding of certain versions of ‘mod-
erate naturalism.’ The same is true of William 
Ockham and Thomas Aquinas. The first was 
a nominalist, the second an Aristotelian, and 
therefore a realist. However, they certainly 
were not ‘hard’ naturalists in the modern 
sense of the word. There is no doubt about 
the naturalistic nature of the philosophies of 
Francis Bacon, John Locke, George Berke-
ley and David Hume. Natualistic themes can 
be found in many other philosophical views 
of the modern period, usually not associated 
with naturalism (realism), for example, Blaise 
Pascal[1]. When it comes to contemporary phi-
losophies one should mention Louis Feuer-
bach, early philosophical positivism, especial-
ly August Comte, John Stuart Mill and Herbert 
1Zaluski, W. Realizm Prawniczy Błażeja Pascala (2015), in: 
Stelmach, J., Brożek, B., Kurek, Ł., Eliasz K. (eds.) Naturalizm 
Prawniczy. Stanowiska.
Spencer, then the so-called critical empiricism 
of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius, and fi-
nally the neo-positivism with its postulate of 
physicalism and naturalistic approach to eth-
ics, in particular, the ideas of Moritz Schlick 
and Rudolf Carnap. The twentieth century is 
also the time of the emergence of naturalistic 
jurisprudence, which will be discussed in the 
next section.
It is worthwhile to consider the reasons for 
adopting. Is it the primordial human cogni-
tive inclination, resulting from the evolutionary 
process in which some archetypal represen-
tations on the subject of being and cognition 
emerge, or perhaps something else? One way 
or the other naturalism not only was but still 
is an alternative to the idealistic approach to 
existence, cognition and values, an alterna-
tive not only to all varieties of metaphysics 
but also to all, widely understood, ‘antinatu-
ralistic’ stances. A common premise for defin-
ing different varieties of naturalism is reduc-
tionism. Adopting a reductionist proposition 
in the sphere of ontology is equivalent to the 
acceptance of monism, and in epistemology 
with the acceptance of an extreme or at least 
moderate empiricism. On the other hand, I am 
quite skeptical about the various classifica-
tions and versions of naturalism. The most 
well-known is the classification into extreme 
(hard) naturalism, which assumes that there 
are no nonmaterial substances or properties 
(the ontological thesis) – the consequence of 
this assumption is the conviction that the only 
valid methods of acquiring knowledge are the 
empirical ones (epistemological thesis) – and 
Słowa kluczowe: 
naturalizm prawniczy, filozofia prawa, realizm prawniczy, prawo i psychologia
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moderate (soft) naturalism, which for some 
in the field of ontology will mean taking a re-
alistic view while for others a ‘philosophy in 
the context of science’[2]. Next would be the 
classification of naturalism into ontological 
and methodological versions, and finally the 
notion of naturalism as opposed to antinatu-
ralism. There is no doubt that most of these 
classifications are trivial. The reason for this 
is that, first of all, such classifications can be 
appropriately applied to most other philo-
sophical positions. Therefore, I would advise 
against attributing them a greater role than a 
mere ordering of meanings.
Naturalism faces many objections. I would 
like to highlight three which are, in my opinion, 
the most important. The first one is related 
with the so-called naturalistic fallacy. This fal-
lacy is discussed by George Edward Moore in 
the context of ‘the open-question argument’. 
According to this argument, any naturalistic 
analysis of ethical (or, more broadly, norma-
tive) predicates must be somehow inaccu-
rate. We make a naturalistic fallacy whenever 
we assume that a particular ethical quality is 
2Heller, M. (1995) Możliwa jest filozofia w nauce?, in: Heller, M., 
Szczęście w przestrzeniach Banacha, Kraków, p. 17 and in: 
Załuski, W. Naturalizm jako samobójstwo myśli, article published 
in this volume.  
identical to a certain empirical quality on the 
basis of the premise that if something pos-
sesses one property, it also has the other[3]. 
The antinaturalistic argument, both non-evo-
lutionary (Blaise Pascal, Gilbert K.Chesterton, 
John B.S. Haldane and C.S. Lewis) and 
evolutionary (in particular Alvin Plantinga) is 
based on the assumption that only a dualistic 
conception of the world is valid[4]. This argu-
ment is therefore directed primarily against 
ontological naturalism which assumes ma-
terialism. Finally, the third objection against 
naturalism pertains to the consequences 
of the classification into extreme (hard) and 
moderate (soft) naturalism. It is argued that 
the extreme naturalism which presupposes a 
monistic (materialistic) view on what there is 
does not accept intermediate solutions, and 
thus, in the view of the opponents of that po-
sition, can easily be undermined – by pointing 
out areas where the hard naturalistic analysis 
cannot be directly applied. Such a conviction 
was essentially the foundation of ‘the open-
question’ and ‘the suicide of thought’ argu-
ments. In turn, moderate naturalism is often 
3Stelmach, J. Błąd naturalistyczny i antynaturalistyczny w dys-
kursie normatywnym, in: Brożek, A., Brożek, B., Stelmach, J., 
(2013), Fenomen normatywności, Kraków, p. 197. 
4Załuski, W. Naturalizm jako samobójstwo myśli. 
And finally, the reliability of our version of naturalism, regard-
less of whether it is extreme or moderate, will be determined 
by the quality and coherence of our philosophical justifica-
tion rather arguments formulated from different ontological 
viewpoints.
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accused of being ‘blurry’. The critics point out 
that it is difficult and even impossible in some 
cases to indicate the boundary between mod-
erate naturalism and moderate antinaturalism. 
Probably this is why some modern interpreta-
tions deliberately ignore this classification[5].
Ultimately, such disputes can never be re-
solved unambiguously. The proposed solutions 
will always be in line with the views of only one 
side of the argument. Why? Because any par-
ticipant in this debate, regardless of whether 
he is a proponent of naturalist or antinaturalist 
approach, is appealing to different ontological 
and epistemological assumptions. Naturalism 
itself has always dealt well with objections, in-
cluding the ones mentioned above. Extreme 
naturalism accepting a monistic vision of the 
world is easily defensible against both the 
‘open-question’ and the ‘suicide of thought’ 
arguments[6]. The proponents of extreme natu-
ralism point out that both arguments are based 
on the arbitrary assumption that the dualistic 
vision of the world is the only valid one. Op-
ponents of naturalism, taking the perspective 
of ontological dualism, want to criticize an-
other viewpoint, in this case extreme natural-
ism which advocates ontological monism. On 
the other hand, why could not we consider 
the arguments ‘in the other direction’, namely 
the ‘antinaturalistic fallacy’ and ‘idealism as a 
suicide of thought?’[7] Moderate naturalism, on 
the other hand, is not controversial and can be 
5Eliasz, K. Naturalizm liberalny (2015), in: Stelmach, J., Brożek, 
B., Kurek, Ł., Eliasz K. eds. Naturalizm prawniczy. Interpretacje.
6Stelmach, J. O problemie prawdziwości norm inaczej; Brożek, 
A. Autorytet deontyczny i epistemiczny w sytuacji imperatywnej; 
Stelmach, J. A jeśli powinność nie istnieje?, in: Brożek, A., Brożek, 
B., Stelmach, J. Fenomen normatywności, p. 45, 55, 205. 
7Stelmach, J. Błąd naturalistyczny i antynaturalistyczny w dys-
kursie normatywnym, p. 198.
relatively easily reconciled with other stances, 
even those competing with naturalism[8]. And 
finally, the reliability of our version of natural-
ism, regardless of whether it is extreme or 
moderate, will be determined by the quality 
and coherence of our philosophical justifica-
tion rather arguments formulated from different 
ontological viewpoints.
2. Legal naturalism
Now it is time to address legal naturalism. Al-
though it is not, in my opinion, a special case 
of naturalism as such, we must remember that 
the object of analysis is not the world as a 
whole but a certain, undoubtedly specific thing 
that is the law (the phenomenon of law). Legal 
naturalism, most often under the label of legal 
realism, can be described, and such interpre-
tations prevail, as a ‘third way’ in contemporary 
philosophy and theory of law, being an alter-
native to the broadly understood law of nature 
and legal positivism. Less often legal natural-
ism is recognized as the ‘second way’ of mod-
ern jurisprudence. In this case, the object of at-
tention is the very definition of law. According 
to legal naturalism (realism), ‘law’ is a certain 
empirical phenomenon (conglomerate of spe-
cific facts) and according to the antinaturalistic 
interpretations (both those referring to the law 
of nature and to legal positivism) ‘law’ and its 
essence is reduced to a ideally existing rule/
norm or, what is ultimately the same, to a cer-
tain interpretative construct having only nor-
mative meaning[9]. Someone might claim that 
8What is also highlighted in the conclusions of W. Zaluski in the 
article cited earlier.
9At the same time, I am aware that the substantial conceptions 
of the law of nature presuppose the possibility of reducing the 
norm to objectively existing values and consequently to a real 
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I make implausible simplifications similar to 
the previously criticised stigmatization of cer-
tain philosophical positions, but I am merely 
referring to the ‘place’ of legal naturalism on 
the map of the contemporary philosophy and 
theory of law. Particularly, I do not want to de-
rive any further consequences from these dis-
tinctions. Therefore I want to limit the discus-
sion on legal naturalism to an outline of views 
held in the twentieth-century philosophy and 
the theory of law.
The criterion for recognizing certain legal 
conceptions as naturalistic may be disputed. 
The well-defined conception of extreme le-
gal naturalism will not cover all variations of 
moderate naturalism and vice versa. How-
ever, even adopting a broader definition may 
not be sufficient to determine whether certain 
legal conceptions may still be considered 
as naturalistic or not. These doubts include 
such philosophical positions as the School 
of Free Law, Critical Legal Studies and the 
Law & Economics movement.[10] In the legal 
literature, the term ‘legal realism’, which was 
generally given a broad meaning, was finally 
adopted. This concept denotes not only all 
naturalistic views on the law, but also at least 
some ‘borderline viewpoints’.[11]
existence.
10Stelmach, J., Sarkowicz, R. (1998) Filozofia prawa XIX i XX 
wieku, Kraków, p. 89, 175 and Stelmach, J., Brożek, B., Załuski, 
W. (2007) Dziesięć wykładów o ekonomii prawa, Warszawa, p. 
11, 25.
11Of course the term ‘legal naturalism’ has also been and is used 
in law (theory and philosophical law) used, though much less fre-
quently. For example: Stelmach, J. (1984) Naturalistyczny i an-
tynaturalistyczny model teorii prawa, Legal Studies, p. 3–4; Leiter, 
B. (2007) Naturalizing Jurisprudence, Oxford; Woleński, J. Natu-
ralizm w teorii prawa (2010), in: W poszukiwaniu dobra wspól-
nego. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Macieja Zielińskiego, 
eds. Chodun A., Czepita S., Szeczecin, as well as numerous proj-
ects under the project Naturalisation of law.
Legal naturalism is associated primarily with 
the American and Scandinavian legal realisms. 
However, this limitation seems to be insuffi-
cient. In the twentieth century jurisprudence, 
especially in Europe, the naturalist theme has 
appeared in many different legal conceptions, 
not always associated with the legal realism. 
First things first though.
At first it is worth mentioning that American 
legal realism can be interpreted in two ways: 
narrowly or widely. In the first case, we talk 
about the canonical school of legal realism 
which began with Oliver Holmes and John Ch. 
Gray, and whose most prominent representa-
tives alongside those already mentioned, were 
Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn[12]. Consider-
ing this line of American jurisprudence more 
broadly, the sociological jurisprudence of Ro-
scoe Pound can also be regarded as realistic 
and, taking into account some of the doubts 
noted above, also Critical Legal Studies and 
Law & Economics.[13] In both conceptions 
there are certain assumptions that are char-
acteristic of legal naturalism, but we have to 
remember that they remained in strong ‘ideo-
logical’ opposition.[14] The former was far left 
and the second was definitely right-wing. 
The number and diversity of conceptions of 
12More on this subject is written by M. Gorazda in the article U 
źródeł amerykańskiego realizmu prawnego, published in the vol-
ume Naturalizm prawniczy. Stanowiska.
13Unger, R. M. (2005) Ruch studiów krytycznych nad prawem, 
Warszawa and Posner, R. A. (2003) Economic Analysis of Law, 
Aspen Publishers, Wolters Kluwer Company. 
14First of all, both positions broke with the positivist conception 
of law as a perfectly valid norm. According to the views of the 
CLS representatives, law is a social phenomenon, a collection of 
real relationships, and for L&E advocates the law analysis can be 
reduced to economic analysis, and with some simplification, law 
can be interpreted as a set of relations or economic facts.
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legal naturalism in European jurisprudence is 
astounding. Certain assumptions characteris-
tic of legal realism can be found in the afore-
mentioned school of free law, especially in the 
works of Hermann Kantorowicz and Stanisław 
Ehrlich[15]. Most often associated with the Eu-
ropean legal realism, however, is still the Scan-
dinavian school whose most prominent rep-
resentatives were certainly Axel Hägerstrӧm, 
Karl Olivecrona and Alf Ross[16]. This is not 
the place, however, where the naturalistic re-
flection in the European jurisprudence ends. 
Attention should be drawn to the realism of 
the Russian philosophy and theory of law, to 
Leon Petrażycki’s psychological theory, and 
finally to French and Italian legal realisms[17]. 
15In Polish literature the unfortunate term ‘free law school’ or 
‘school of free jurisprudence’ has been adopted, in German lit-
erature Freirechtsbewegung or Freirechtslehre having slightly dif-
ferent meaning were used.
16More on this subject is written by K. Eliasz in the article 
Obowiązywanie prawa w ujęciu skandynawskiego realizmu 
prawnego published in: Naturalizm prawniczy. Stanowiska.
17J. Stanek writes about Russian legal realism in the articles Ro-
syjski realizm prawny and Teoria Nikołaja Korkunowa – pierwsza 
próba psychologicznego ujęcia prawa; B. Brożek writes about 
Petrażycki, Emocje jako fundament prawa. Uwagi o teorii Leona 
Naturalistic themes can be found in many 
other philosophical conceptions, which seem 
to have nothing to do with legal realism. For 
example, in the case of the positivist Herbert 
Hart when it comes to his understanding of 
the rule of recognition, or Arthur Kaufmann, 
the advocate of legal hermeneutics who con-
siders the case of ‘specific law’ dependent on 
the empirical context[18].
For some reason, the twentieth-century project 
of legal naturalism has not been completed. 
There are probably many reasons for departure 
from naturalistic positions which where espe-
cially popular in the seventies of the previous 
century. I want to try to list some of them. The 
first of these is the inconsistency of some con-
Petrażyckiego and A. Brożek, Leona Petrażyckiego wizja logiki 
adekwatnej; about the French legal realism in turn W. Załuski in 
the already mentioned article (ref.1), and about the Italian realism 
A. Serpe in the article: W perspektywie realizmu. Norberto Bob-
bio o prawie, polityce i demokracji. All these articles are published 
in Naturalizm prawniczy. Stanowiska. 
18Stelmach, J. (2001) Reguła uznania, in: Stelmach, J. (ed.), Stu-
dia z filozofii prawa, Kraków, Vol. I, p. 63.; Kaufmann, A. (1986) 
Vorüberlegungen zu einer juristischen Logik und Ontologie der 
Relationen. Grundlegung einer personalen Rechtstheorie, in: 
Rechtstheorie, Vol. 17, p. 258. 
According to legal naturalism (realism), ‘law’ is a certain em-
pirical phenomenon (conglomerate of specific facts) and 
according to the antinaturalistic interpretations (both those 
referring to the law of nature and to legal positivism) ‘law’ 
and its essence is reduced to a ideally existing rule/norm 
or, what is ultimately the same, to a certain interpretative 
construct having only normative meaning.
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ceptions of legal naturalism. There was no per-
severance in the construction of particular the-
ories. I am referring in particular to the proper 
connection of naturalistic ontology of law and 
legal epistemology. Even if this condition was 
fulfilled, as it was the case with Petrażycki’s 
conception, we can see that his understand-
ing of psychology did not stand the test of 
time. The second reason for the decline in the 
interest in legal naturalism was the change of 
the ‘existing paradigms’, in particular the turn 
towards the analytical research on law which 
was made primarily in the European philosophy 
and theory of law, precisely in the seventies of 
the last century. The last reason that comes to 
my mind, perhaps the most important one, is 
the indifference of ‘old naturalism’ to new, le-
gally related and naturalistic ideas developed 
in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and 
economics. The few attempts to renew the 
naturalistic thinking in contemporary Western 
philosophy and theory of law have not been so 
successful so far. The best example of this may 
be the version of legal naturalism presented in 
a recently published book by Brian Leiter[19].
3. Perspectives of legal naturalism
I would like to discuss five different possible 
directions of the development of legal natural-
ism, namely philosophical, psychological, neu-
roscience, economical, as well as legal-philo-
sophical and -dogmatic perspectives.
First, a brief commentary on the ‘philosophi-
cal perspective’. It is definitely possible to 
19Leiter, B. (2007) Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essay on American 
Legalism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, Oxford. This work is 
essentially a collection of essays published over the last 17 years. 
It is difficult to build a coherent conception of legal naturalism on 
the basis of these essays.
construct an ontologically and epistemologi-
cally coherent conception of law that utilizes 
the achievements of contemporary naturalist-
oriented philosophies. We can imagine at least 
a few different philosophical variants of such a 
‘new legal naturalism’. In the first place we can 
use the so-called ‘cognitive philosophies’, then 
all those that use the findings of modern biol-
ogy and medicine. Let us remember the theo-
ries quoted move in areas that are also exploit-
ed by the naturalistically oriented psychology 
and neuroscience. The boundaries between 
particular types of reflection, here called ‘per-
spectives’, are often blurred. And finally, we 
can also reach for ‘postmodernist philosophy’ 
which definitely includes naturalist themes[20].
Another perspective of legal naturalism is the 
‘psychological’ perspective. And in this case 
we certainly have the opportunity to build a co-
herent, ontological and epistemological, natu-
ralistic theory of law that refers to findings of 
modern psychology. Essentially, at least some 
of such psychologically-oriented conceptions 
of legal naturalism which will refer either to 
psychological theories proposed by cognitive 
psychologists, which also includes evolution-
ary psychology, or to psycholinguistics and 
cognitive linguistics[21].
It would also be worthwhile to consider the 
20Postmodernism is attributed to Critical Legal Studies which 
was already mentioned in relation to naturalist (realistic) philoso-
phies of law. In addition to CLS, Morawski also mentions ethnic, 
feminist, ecological and literary theories of law, and in a broader 
perspective, also communitarian and neopragmatic positions. 
At least some of these concepts, such as feminist and ecologi-
cal ones, can certainly be interpreted in a naturalistic way. See 
Morawski, L. (2001), Co może dać nauce prawa postmodernizm?, 
Toruń, p. 35.
21We have many different divisions and systematisation of psy-
chological theories. Therefore I would not like to give too much 
importance to the division proposed in the text.
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conception of legal naturalism which takes into 
account the ‘perspective of neuroscience’. In 
this case we could refer to either one of the 
two basic approaches to neuroscience, or to 
one of the three fundamental paradigms with-
in this science. The first approach (narrower) 
would be used to build a model of the natu-
ralisation of law on the basis of neurobiological 
theories. On the other hand, the second view 
(broader) could also take into account findings 
other than just the ones pertaining to the hu-
man brain, particularly philosophical and psy-
chological theories. In addition, we would have 
to choose at least one of the three basic para-
digms of neuroscience, namely the computer 
paradigm, the evolutionary paradigm and the 
so-called paradigm of embodied-embedded 
mind[22]. The computer paradigm includes, but 
is not limited to, connectionism – which boils 
down to the modelling of cognitive processes 
by tools such as artificial neural networks. The 
next paradigm of neuroscience underlines the 
role of evolutionary psychology. The last one 
refers to the ‘embodied mind’ and the ‘mind 
embedded in culture and social interactions’[23]. 
When considering the perspective of neurosci-
ence, we clearly see its close relationship with 
the two previously commented perspectives of 
legal naturalism, namely the philosophical and 
psychological. These interrelations and de-
pendencies are very well illustrated in Mateusz 
Hohol’s work cited earlier.
Economy is the another perspective of legal 
naturalism. In this case we have to deal with 
a specialized type of reflection on law that will 
use economic methods. On the other hand, 
22More on Paradigms of Cognitive Neuroscience, in: Hohol, M. 
(2013) Wyjaśnić umysł, Kraków, p. 85.
23Ibidem, p. 88–89, 113–125, 125–153.
it can be argued whether the methods of the 
economic analysis of law can be interpreted in 
a naturalistic way. Probably most of them can, 
because many of them are connected withthe 
developments in the field of cognitive psychol-
ogy. This is the case with the concept of homo 
economicus which is of a fundamental impor-
tance for the economic analysis of law[24]. 
The construction of a naturalist conception of 
law that takes into account the achievements of 
contemporary philosophy of law and legal dog-
matics means adopting a different perspective 
than the four preceding cases, namely ‘the in-
ternal perspective of law.’ This does not mean, 
however, that in attempting to build a naturalis-
tic philosophy of law or naturalistic legal dog-
matics we are going to turn down achievements 
of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and 
economics, limiting ourselves to purely legal 
analysis and research. Not at all! The starting 
point would just be different. It would always be 
the valid law, a specific system of law or a spe-
cialized legal field. The next steps, pertaining 
to the construction of the naturalistic model of 
law, not only could but should take into account 
relevant findings of the aforementioned scien-
tific disciplines, regardless whether lawyers like 
it or not. Taking into account the developments 
in the contemporary philosophy, psychology, 
neuroscience and economics, I believe that fur-
ther isolation of jurisprudence from these disci-
plines is simply impossible.
Finally, I must say that I am referring here to 
the ‘perspectives of legal naturalism’, that is 
the possible directions of the development 
24Similar stance is presented by W. Zaluski in his monograph de-
voted to the use of game theory in the field of law. See Załuski, W. 
(2013), Game Theory in Jurisprudence, Kraków, and in particular, 
Epilogue, Law and Economics and the Project of the Naturaliza-
tion of Law, p. 289.
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of naturalistic conceptions of law and not the 
existing conceptions. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that recently Polish philosophers of 
law have made extremely promising attempts , 
unlike those undertaken in the West, for exam-
ple by the critically acclaimed Leiter, to build 
naturalistic interpretations of law that take into 
account ‘new’ perspectives: philosophical, 
psychological, neuroscientific and economic. I 
mainly refer to the works of two authors, Barto-
sz Brożek and Wojciech Załuski. The first stud-
ied legal naturalism from the perspective of 
contemporary philosophy and neuroscience. 
The second focused his attention on other per-
spectives of legal naturalism, namely the psy-
chological perspective, more specifically the 
perspective of evolutionary psychology, and 
on the economic perspective – especially the 
game-theoretic one[25].
4. Benefits and risks
First, I would like to discuss two, in my opin-
ion, most important benefits of adopting a 
naturalistic view of law. The first benefit would 
be the creation of new specialized models of 
25Brożek, B. (2012) Normatywność prawa, Warszawa; idem, 
Rule-Following Kraków 2013 and Załuski, W. (2009) Ewolucyjna 
filozofia prawa, Warszawa, English version: Elgar, E. (2009) Evo-
lutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy and Game Theory in Ju-
risprudence.
the naturalisation of law which would allow for 
a slightly different approach that the standard 
theories do not offer – a broader legal frame-
work and, consequently, opening of juripru-
dence to new methods of investigation and in-
terpretation. In the era of further technological 
and scientific revolutions, in the era of global 
civilization, holding on to the existing legal par-
adigms seems to me, as I have already noted, 
completely groundless. 
The second benefit consists in determining the 
fields of application of these models and thus 
demonstrating their practical usefulness. This 
would allow, among other things, to redefine 
many basic concepts from the legal dictionary 
such as ‘ownership’, ‘action’, ‘will’, ‘responsi-
bility’, ‘guilt’, ‘consciousness’, ‘sanity’ and ‘er-
ror’. Let us note that definitions and concepts 
developed and adopted at the turn of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, during the pe-
riod of great codifications and of fundamental 
importance for the continental system of law, 
referred to the findings of the psychological 
theories of the day, which today are simply 
considered as false. Sooner or later something 
needs to be done with this anyway!
It is now time to discuss the potential risks as-
sociated with the adoption of new models of 
legal naturalisation. I would point out at least 
two such risks.
In the era of further technological and scientific revolutions, 
in the era of global civilization, holding on to the existing le-
gal paradigms seems to me, as I have already noted, com-
pletely groundless. 
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